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Prior Informed Consent: an Emerging
Compromise for Hazardous Exports
Many developing nations lack a regulatory infrastructure capable of con-
trolling effectively the importation of hazardous waste, dangerous chem-
icals, pesticides, and consumer products. Despite this, producer nations
often allow the exportation of products they deem unsafe for domestic
use. The resulting importation endangers foreign consumers and dam-
ages the economy and environment of importing countries. The United
States, other national governments, and various international organiza-
tions have responded to the ever-increasing export of hazardous prod-
ucts with a variety of regulatory mechanisms. Neither the United States
nor international policy-makers, however, have established a uniform,
effective mechanism to govern hazardous exports.'
For the United States, a viable control mechanism must harmonize
three competing interests: promoting U.S. exports, protecting world
health, safety, and environment, and preserving sovereignty of other
nations to choose which products to import.2 Ideally, the control mech-
1. Hazardous exports are often defined as products banned or severely
restricted by the exporting nation's government. Because of inherent safety risks
hazardous waste is also a hazardous export. See SPECIAL MEETING, TO REVIEW IMPLE-
MENTATION OF THE OECD COUNCIL RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING INFORMATION
EXCHANGE RELATED TO EXPORT OF BANNED OR SEVERELY RESTRICTED CHEMICALS, A
REVIEW OF DEFINITIONS OF THE TERM "BANNED OR SEVERELY RESTRICTED" AS USED BY
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (Sept. 8-10, 1986) (comparing definitions of
"banned" and "severely restricted" as used by a variety of international organiza-
tions including the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
United Nations Environment Program and the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization.
2. In 1978, the House Committee on Government Operations submitted a
report, based on a study by the Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs Sub-
committee, which investigated the export of products banned by U.S. regulatory
agencies. The report expressed two findings:
(1) The United States has significant responsibility for the safety of goods it
sells abroad. It cannot condone the export of regulated products which it
knows to be harmful either to foreign consumers or the local or world
environment.
(2) This responsibility must be exercised in a way which respects the sover-
eignty of other nations and accounts for differing conditions which may affect
judgments of health or safety.
HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, EXPORT OF PRODUCTS BANNED BY U.S. REGULA-
TORY AGENCIES, H.R. REP. No. 1686, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 31 (1978) [hereinafter
1978 HOUSE REPORT]; see also "Dear Colleague" letter by SenatorJohn Glenn (D-OH)
dated June 26, 1985; 131 CONG. REC. S1380 (daily ed. June 26, 1985) (statement of
Sen. Glenn) (available at Cornell International Law Journal office).
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anism should provide foreign governments with the information neces-
sary to make health, safety, and environmental regulatory decisions.3
In recent years, an international movement has advocated adoption
of a uniform policy requiring importing nations' consent for exports of
products banned or severely regulated by exporting nations in their
domestic markets. This approach to hazardous export control is most
often known as "prior informed consent" (PIC). On a spectrum of pos-
sible policy choices, prior informed consent rests between an absolute
export ban on products deemed unsafe domestically by the exporting
nation and notice and information exchange systems. Environmentalists
view prior informed consent as "at present, probably the most effective
means of regulating international trade" in hazardous exports. 4 Indus-
trialists, however, criticize the approach as "inherently impractical, bur-
densome, and bureaucratic." 5
This Note examines the hazardous export problem and reviews sev-
eral approaches that the United States and international organizations
have taken to govern such exports. After describing recent adoptions of
prior informed consent procedures, the Note assesses current policies
and contends that prior informed consent, while no panacea, is the best
approach for dealing with hazardous exports. The United States, there-
fore, should adopt prior informed consent domestically and urge its
adoption in the international arena.
I. Background
A. The Hazardous Export Problem
Hazardous exports consist of products officials of the exporting state
deem unsafe for domestic use.6 Although the volume of U.S. hazardous
exports is uncertain, one congressional committee estimated that
"[a]mong the vast numbers of American products exported annually are
millions of dollars worth of consumer products, drugs, pesticides,
devices, and chemicals which a U.S. regulatory agency has determined
to be unsafe for domestic consumption. ' 7
3. 1978 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 3.
4. International Organization of Consumers Unions, Regional Office for Asia
and the Pacific, Communication of August 7, 1986 [hereinafter IOCU Communica-
tion]. David Bull, formerly of Oxfam and currently Executive of the Nairobi based
Environmental Liaison Center noted that the Pesticide Action Network has argued:
"Exports of banned, withdrawn, severely restricted, unregistered pesticides should
be forbidden without the explicit consent of the importing country [sic] government
after a full exchange of scientific and regulatory information." Bull, The New Interna-
tional Pesticides Code: Unprecedented Toolfor Activists, 6J. PESTICIDE REFORM No. 1, 20, 21
(Spring 1986).
5. National Agricultural Chemicals Association Position on the "Prior Consent"
Concept of Export Control of Agrochemicals in International Trade (November 30,
1986) [hereinafter NACA Position Paper] (available at the National Agricultural
Chemicals Association, Washington, D.C.).
6. See supra note 1.
7. 1978 HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 1.
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To solve the hazardous export problem, nations must establish reg-
ulatory structures capable of balancing diverse national interests in eco-
nomic development with concerns for health and environmental safety.
Many developing states, however, lack the sophisticated administrative
capacity needed to make choices balancing safety with development. As
a result, these states are unable to monitor effectively an import's use.
For example, highly toxic substances that only professionals or highly
skilled experts may use in a developed country often fall into the hands
of untrained workers in Third World countries. 8 The immediate prob-
lem, therefore, is how to handle current hazardous product exports
from primarily western industrialized nations to the Third World. 9
Some sources estimate that pesticides poison approximately
250,000 people annually, resulting in 6,700 fatalities. 10 As two com-
mentators noted:
In 1981, over 600 million pounds of pesticides were exported to develop-
ing nations. U.S. exports comprised 75% of those shipments, a large pro-
portion of which were pesticides that were either restricted or not
registered in this country. Thirty-one million pounds of the exported
pesticides had been suspended or cancelled in the U.S. due to the dan-
gers they pose to humans, wildlife, and the environment. 1
The situations of Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia exemplify these
pesticide import problems. Malaysia, for instance, suffers from an
alarming problem of paraquat poisoning. 12 Although several countries
have banned or severely restricted the use of paraquat, one of the most
hazardous chemicals in the world, the Malaysian Pesticides Board has
8. MINISTER OF HOUSING, PHYSICAL PLANNING AND THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE
NETHERLANDS, THE EXPORT OF DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES AND PREPARATIONS 7 (avail-
able at the Cornell International Law Journal office).
9. See Wirth, Emerging Standards for Exports of Hazardous Substances, 79 PROC. AM.
Soc'Y OF INT'L L. 310, 312 (1985); see also Goldberg, Efforts to Prevent Misuse of Pesticides
Exported to Developing Countries: Progressing Beyond Regulation and Notification, 12 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 1025, 1030-33 (1985);J. Scherr, Hazardous Exports: United States and Interna-
tional Policy Developments 2 (May 1985) (unpublished manuscript available at the
office of the Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington D.C.) (explaining con-
cern over the last decade about the "double standard" in U.S. laws permitting
exports of banned products and substances).
10. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, SAFE USE OF PESTICIDES (1973) (20th Report
of the WHO expert Committee on Insecticides, Tech. Rept. Series No. 513). These
may be conservative estimates, since a large number ofpoisonings are not diagnosed
or are not reported. See Interagency Working Group on a Hazardous Substances
Export Policy, 45 Fed. Reg. 53754, 53755 (1980) [hereinafter Working Group
Report] (draft report);J. Scherr, supra note 9, at 6-7. Many of these poisonings result
from use of certain classes of pesticides which degrade quickly but are extremely
toxic when applied. Id
11. Sheeline & Bramble, Silent Spring Rerun: Pesticides in the Global Environment, 6J.
PESTICIDE REFORM No. 1, 29, 31 (Spring 1986).
12. Sahabat Alan Malaysia, Paraquat: Another Scourge from the Merchants of Death, 6J.
PESTICIDE REFORM No. 1, 13 (Spring 1986). Since 1980, more than 1,200 people
have died of paraquat poisoning due to accidental poisonings, suicide, or exposure
from handling. Id.
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registered paraquat for general use in Malaysia.' 8 Malaysian workers
routinely use paraquat without proper safety protections.14 In 1987,
researchers found similar pesticide import problems in Indonesia and
Thailand.15 They discovered the United States sending to one or both
of the countries large quantities of six pesticides which it severely
restricted for domestic use.' 6 The researchers found the use of such
pesticides in a Third World country presented clear dangers; whereas
U.S. users must wear "long-sleeved clothing, gloves, goggles and an
approved respirator," Third World users often use them with no knowl-
edge of their danger. 17
13. Id. at 13-14. Paraquat is either severely restricted or banned in Sweden, Can-
ada, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, the Philippines and Turkey. Id. at 15.
According to the United Nations, paraquat, a herbicide, is among the most hazard-
ous chemicals in the world. "When ingested or absorbed by humans, paraquat is a
highly toxic compound that causes injury primarily to the liver, kidney and lungs."
Id.
14. Id. at 14. "Workers who constantly spray pesticides do so without any protec-
tion. They are not given proper safety equipment nor instructions on how to safely
use the pesticides. Protective clothing or rubber boots are often dismissed as a cum-
bersome luxury." Id.
15. M. HANSEN & S. RENGAM, VIOLATING THE CODE: A PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF
INDONESIA, THE PHILIPPINES AND THAILAND 3 (1987) [hereinafter VIOLATING THE
CODE SURVEY] (available at the office of Institute for Consumer Policy Research,
Mount Vernon, New York).
16. VIOLATING THE CODE SURVEY, supra note 15, at 14. The six pesticides
included aldicarb, carbofuran, chlordane, heptachlor, methamidophos, and
monocrotophos. The report held:
1. Aldicarb was restricted (i.e., can only be applied by certified trained
applicators or those under their direct supervision) by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) on February 9, 1978.
2. Carbofuran was restricted by the EPA on August 8, 1979.
3. All uses of chlordane and heptachlor, except for ground insertion by
trained certified applicators for termite control, were cancelled by the EPA in
1976.
4. Methamidophos was restricted by the EPA in January, 1981.
5. Monocrotophos was restricted by the EPA in August, 1979.
Id. The table below indicates, as an example, the quantity of pesticides, restricted in
the United States, imported into Thailand between 1982 and 1984.
Quantity Imported in Thousands of Kilograms
Country
Pesticide Brand Name 1982 1983 1984 Imported From
Aldicarb 10%o Temik 1OG 116.9 45.0 10.4 U.S.A.
Carbofuran 757o Furadan - - 166.4 U.S.A.
Chlordane 100%o Chlordane 20.1 20.1 18.4 U.S.A.
Heptachlor 73%o Heptachlor 27.2 31.8 54.4 U.S.A.
Methamidophos - - - 119.1 Korea and U.S.A.
Monocrotophos Azodrin - - 416.3 U.S.A.
Id. (summarizing data from PESTICIDES BROUGHT IN OR IMPORTED, YEAR 1984 (com-
piled by Preecha Chupanish and Boonsong Huntangkabordee, Department of Agri-
culture, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Thailand).
17. Id. at 15. The survey findings concluded:
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Export of banned or severely restricted consumer products also
poses a problem. For example, federal regulations required U.S. manu-
facturers to treat children's sleepwear with the chemical flame retardant
TRIS;18 in April 1977, however, the Consumer Product Safety Commis-
sion banned domestic sales of TRIS sleepwear after TRIS' carcinogenic
properties were discovered. 19 Exports of TRIS-treated garments never-
theless continued for more than a year, resulting in the export to Asia,
Africa, and South America of approximately 2.4 million pieces. 20
Similarly, U.S. companies shipped several hundred thousand dan-
gerous, domestically-banned baby pacifiers overseas between June 30,
1977, when the ban was announced, and February 26, 1978, when the
ban became effective.2 1  As a House Committee concluded,
"[M]anufacturers took advantage of the time between the proposed and
final action to export inventory of products which would be subject to
the action."'22
As these examples illustrate, many Third World nations, including
relatively developed ones, are unable to protect their citizens from dan-
gerous pesticides and consumer products.2 3 In 1986, for example, the
We found evidence of large quantities of restricted products being shipped
into Thailand from the United States. No doubt this might also be happen-
ing with the other major exporters of pesticides. These restricted toxic pesti-
cides are used by Third World farmers who often have no idea of their
dangers. Some of the pesticides, like Temik lOG and Furadan, have been
sold in unlabelled plastic bags. The U.S. regulations require protective cloth-
ing, "long-sleeved clothing, gloves, goggles and an approved respirator,"
which could be worn when these pesticides are used by certified trained
applicators. In the Third World, pesticides may be repackaged by workers
who use no protective clothing, and then sold unlabelled to farmers who
often do not take the necessary precautions. Used in these conditions, these
pesticides become potentially very hazardous. This shows a need for prior
informed consent. PIG will serve to increase the sovereignty of importing
countries by giving them active control over pesticide imports.
Id.
18. Working Group Report, supra note 10, at 53755; see also Consumer Product Safety
Commission's Ban on Tris : Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government
Operations of the House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1977) [hereinafter Tris
Hearings].
19. Working Group Report, supra note 10, at 53755; see also Tris Hearings, supra
note 18, at 271-72; andJ. Scherr, supra note 9, at 3.
20. Working Group Report, supra note 10, at 53755; see alsoJ. Scherr, supra note 9,
at 4.
21. 1978 HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 10.
22. Id.
23. For example, the powerful nerve attacking pesticide, Leptophos, manufac-
tured in the United States principally for export, was never registered by the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) for domestic use. Millions of pounds were
exported to 50 countries between 1971 and 1976. In 1971 and 1972, a number of
Egyptian farmers suffered from hallucinations and impairment of vision and speech
after using the pesticide.
Although the EPA established stringent training and certification standards for
domestic users of registered pesticides, the United States annually exports tens of
millions of pounds of pesticides to countries lacking similar user certification require-
ments. Moreover, the United States exports products that the EPA cancelled or sus-
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Malaysian Pesticides Board Chairman, Datuk Abu Baker Mahmud,
stated that the Pesticide Board lacked the expertise and equipment to
study the effects of widespread toxic pesticide use.24 Indeed, the Pesti-
cide Board has not undertaken a single study during its nine years of
existence.25 Other Third World nations also lack the necessary govern-
mental resources. Typically, the "entire staff of a ministry of agriculture
in a developing country may consist of only one or two people with
'nothing but a motorcycle and no fuel.' "26
B. Methods of Regulating Hazardous Exports
To address the hazardous export problem, the United States and vari-
ous international organizations employ several hazardous export control
techniques, 27 including export bans of unapproved products, notice and
pended because product use posed unreasonable health and environmental risks. See
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BETTER REGULATION OF PESTICIDE
EXPORTS AND PESTICIDE RESIDUES IN IMPORTED FOOD IS ESSENTIAL 50 Uune 22, 1979)
(report to Congress); see also Agege, Dumping of Dangerous American Products Overseas:
Should Congress Sit and Watch?, J. WORLD TRADE LAw 403,404 (1985); Working Group
Report, supra note 10, at 53755; J. Scherr, supra note 9, at 6-7 (noting that approxi-
mately 29% of the annual 522 million pounds of pesticide exports from the United
States in 1976 were not registered for U.S. use and about 20%6 of these unregistered
pesticides had been cancelled by the EPA because of health risks).
24. Sahabat Alan Malaysia, supra note 12, at 15.
25. Id.
26. Goldberg, supra note 9, at 1030.
27. The United States, for instance, lacks a uniform or comprehensive approach.
Both the Carter and Reagan Administrations unsuccessfully attempted to achieve a
uniform U.S. hazardous export policy. On January 15th, 1981, President Carter
signed Executive Order 12,264, On Federal Policy Regarding the Export of Banned or Sig-
nificantly Restricted Substances, 3 C.F.R. 86 (1982). The Order created a uniform notifi-
cation system governing exports of "banned or significantly restricted" products and
substances. Id.
The Order required improvement of export notice procedures and annual publica-
tion of a summary of U.S. government actions banning or severely restricting sub-
stances for domestic use. The Order also directed the State Department and other
federal agencies to help develop international hazard alert systems. The Order
required agencies to place formal export licensing controls on "extremely hazardous
substances" that seriously threatened human health or the environment and on
exports which threatened U.S. foreign policy interests. Id.; see also DIscussioN PAPER
OF THE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS GROUP OF THE CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIA-
TION AND THE SYNTHETIC ORGANIC CHEMICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION ON THE
EXPORT OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES 11-12 (Sept. 24-25, 1984) [hereinafter CMA
PAPER] (available at the Chemical Manufacturers Association, Washington, D.C.);
Goldberg, supra note 9, at 1035-37; J. Scherr, supra note 9, at 21-22.
On February 17, 1981, President Reagan revoked Executive Order 12,264, stating
that export controls would be unduly burdensome for U.S. industry. See Exec. Order
No. 12,290, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982). See generally Childress, Executive Authority: Revocation
of Executive Order Requiring Notification of Export of Hazardous Substances, 22 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 683 (1981). Reagan also asked the Departments of State and Commerce to
review current hazardous export regulations and make them more consistent and
cost-effective. See Memorandum from President Reagan to the Secretary of State
(Feb. 17, 1981) (available at the Cornell International Law Journal office); see also CMA
PAPER, supra, at 12-13; Goldberg, supra note 9, at 1035-37;J. Scherr, supra note 9, at
22-23.
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international information exchange systems, and the rule of caveat
emptor. This section describes each of these techniques.
1. The Two Extrenms: Outright Prohibitions and Caveat Emptor
Although outright prohibitions of exports receive relatively little discus-
sion in the international regulatory debate,28 United States drug regula-
tions have long provided an example of such a ban. The Federal Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act,2 9 enacted in 1938, until recently prohibited the
export of drugs not approved by the Food and Drug Administration.3 0
Similarly, since 1972, the Federal Republic of Germany has totally
banned the production and export of DDT.
3 1
Caveat emptor, or "let the buyer beware," essentially leaves the con-
trol of dangerous exports to market mechanisms. United States policy
towards consumer products exports, for example, is essentially one of
caveat emptor, since banned or severely restricted products made solely
for export may be exported without warning to importing nations.
3 2
Although application of the doctrine can result from either inaction or
Commerce Secretary Baldridge and Secretary of State Haig submitted their recom-
mendations and report to William Brock, U.S. Trade Representative, on May 12,
1982. The Haig-Baldridge report proposed eliminating existing requirements that
the United States inform foreign governments of export-specific toxic chemical and
pesticide shipments that the United States banned or restricted. The Report also
recommended repealing the prohibition on export of drugs that the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) has not approved for domestic sale, and Department of State
notification to foreign governments of information on all regulatory actions banning
or severely restricting domestic use of a substance. See Haig-Baldridge report at 8-12
(available at the Cornell International Law Journal office); see also CMA PAPER, supra, at
12-13;J. Scherr, supra note 9, at 22-28.
The report did recommend creating international information exchanges and
assisting other countries in developing regulatory expertise. However, the Reagan
Administration neither acted upon the Haig-Baldridge Report nor replaced Execu-
tive Order 12,264 with an alternative, coherent policy.
28. Pallemaerts, Laissez-faire Alive and Well: The International Effort to Protect Trade of
Banned or Severely Restricted Pesticides, 6 J. PESTICIDE REFORM No. 1, 23, 26 (Spring
1986) (discussing pesticide export bans).
29. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 344, 381(d) (1938); see
also 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.1, 511.1 (1987).
30. A recent amendment loosened these trade restrictions, permitting unap-
proved drug exports to twenty-one countries that had approved the use of the drug
in their marketplace. Drug Export Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660,
100 Stat. 3743. The twenty one countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland, and United Kingdom. Id. The legislation erroneously presumes
that nations that have agreed to accept imports have regulatory structures compara-
ble to the Food and Drug Administration; in fact several of those countries, such as
Portugal and Spain, lack the expertise and resources necessary to ensure safe drug
imports from the United States. Telephone Interview with Joseph Goffman, Staff
Attorney, Public Citizen's Congress Watch (Feb. 23, 1987). Some critics fear that
importing nations will be unable or unwilling to ensure that those drugs remain in
their borders. This "supervisory gap" might result in the drugs' importation into
Third World countries, or even back into the United States. Id.
31. Pallemaerts, supra note 28, at 26.
32. See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
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deliberate policy, the U.S. approach clearly seems deliberate rather than
the result of oversight. The Consumer Product Safety Commission
(CPSC), for example, regulates the export of some potentially harmful
consumer products such as flammable fabrics and clothing,3 3 household
items presenting an electrical or mechanical hazard, 34 and some other
consumer products under the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA); 35
these regulations, however, only affect exports that may harm U.S. citi-
zens. The Commission may ban product exports only after determining
that the export "presents an unreasonable risk of injury to persons
residing within the United States (e.g, reimportation)." 3 6 Exporters of
domestically regulated products need only label the product "for
export"3 7 and then notify the CPSC of the export.3 8 The Commission
may not further restrict export of goods made solely for sale outside the
United States.3 9
2. Notice and Notice-Type Systems
a. "Pure" Notice Systems: U.S. Chemical Export Policy
The U.S. chemical export policy typifies a "pure" notice system of con-
trolling hazardous exports. Section 12 of the Toxic Substances Control
33. Flammable fabric and clothing regulations are codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-
1204 (1982); see Note, Exports of Hazardous Products from the United States: An Analysis of
Consumer Product Safety Commission Policy, 19 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 123
(1985).
34. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1276 (1982); see also Note, supra note 33, at 123.
35. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2083 (1982); see also Note, supra note 33, at 123-24.
36. Flammable Fabrics Act, § 15(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (1982); Federal Hazard-
ous Substances Act, § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1264(b) (1982); Consumer Product Safety
Act, § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2067(a) (1982); see also Note, supra note 33, at 124-25.
37. Flammable Fabrics Act, § 15(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (1982); Federal Hazard-
ous Substances Act, § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1264(b) (1982); Consumer Product Safety
Act, § 18(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2067(a)(2) (1982); see also Note, supra note 33, at 123.
38. Flammable Fabrics Act, § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1202(c) (1982); Federal Hazard-
ous Substances Act, § 14(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1273(d) (1982); Consumer Product Safety
Act, § 18(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 2067(b) (1982); see also Note, supra note 33, at 123.
39. See Flammable Fabrics Act, § 15(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1202(a) (1982); Federal Haz-
ardous Substances Act, § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1264(b) (1982); Consumer Product Safety
Act, § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2067(a) (1982); Agege, supra note 23, at 405; see also Note,
supra note 33, at 123.
Until 1983, the Commission's policy was that manufacturers could export goods
not in compliance with Commission safety standards only if the manufacturers origi-
nally intended the products for export and labeled them accordingly. See Note, supra
note 33, at 123.
In July, 1983, the Commission decided In re Imperial Carpet Mills, Inc., 11 Prod.
Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 502 (July 7, 1983). See also Note, supra note 33, at 125. In
that decision, the Commission permitted manufacturers to export flammable prod-
ucts not in compliance with domestic standards and distributed domestically without
an export label. Carpet Mills, 11 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep., at 511; see also 16 C.F.R.
§ 1010.1-.3 (1985); Note, supra note 33, at 125-26.
The Commission contemplated extending this interpretation to the Federal Haz-
ardous Substances Act and CPSA, but the Commission ultimately decided to retain
its prior export policy under these two acts. See CPSA Votes to Maintain CPSA, FHSA
Poliy Prohibiting Exportation of Violative Goods, 12 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 421
(May 18, 1984); 16 C.F.R. § 1010.1-.3 (1985); see also Note, supra note 33, at 126.
Vol. 21
1988 Hazardous Exports
Act (TSCA),40 detailing U.S. chemical export requirements, requires a
two part notification procedure.
First, if the EPA has taken regulatory action against a chemical, the
exporter must notify the EPA of the exportation.41 Second, the EPA
must notify the importing state as to available data concerning the
exported chemical. 42 EPA regulations implementing TSCA then
require the EPA to notify the importing country of the first shipment of
each regulated chemical each year.43 The TSCA notice system informs
the importing state of both the chemical export and of EPA's regulatory
action.44
b. The Awareness Statement: U.S. Pesticide Export Policy
United States pesticide export regulations employ a variant of the notice
control technique, requiring the foreign purchaser to sign an awareness
statement regarding U.S. regulatory action. Section 17 of the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) regulates pesticide
exports and requires the EPA to implement three types of notification.45
First, the EPA must notify all governments and pertinent international
organizations each time the EPA takes major regulatory action on a pes-
ticide (e.g., cancellation or suspension of a pesticides's registration).46
Second, as a prerequisite to export, the foreign purchaser must sign a
statement acknowledging awareness that the United States forbids
domestic use of the pesticide.47 Finally, after the exporter informs the
EPA of the sale, the EPA must inform the importing country's govern-
40. 15 U.S.C. § 2611 (1976).
41. Id.; see also CMA PAPER, supra note 27, at 8-9.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 2611 (1976); see also CMA PAPER, supra note 27, at 8-9.
43. 40 C.F.R. § 707.70 (1987). The regulation states that:
(a) Notice by EPA to the importing country shall be sent no later than five
working days after receipt by the Document Control Officer of the first
annual notification for each regulated chemical.
(b) Notices shall:
(1) Identify the regulated chemical.
(2) Summarize the regulatory action taken, or indicate the availability of
data under section 4 or 5(b) of TSCA.
(3) Identify an EPA official to contact for further information.
(4) Include a copy of the pertinent FEDERAL REGISTER notice.
(c) Notices shall be sent to the country's ambassador in Washington, DC, or
other official designated by the foreign government, and to the United States
Department of State.
Id.; see also CMA PAPER, supra note 27, at 9-10; Wirth, supra note 9, at 314.
44. 40 C.F.R. 707.70 (1987). See also CMA PAPER, supra note 27, at 9-10; Wirth,
supra note 9, at 12-13.
45. 7 U.S.C. § 1360 (1978).
46. Id.; see also Statement of Policy on the Labeling of Exported Pesticides,
Devices, and Pesticide Ingredients and Procedures for Exporting Unregistered Pesti-
cides, 45 Fed. Reg. 50274 (1980) [hereinafter Labeling Policy Statement];J. Scherr &
E. Spitalnik, National Laws Relating to Exports of Chemicals, In Particular Pesticides
a Selected Review 3-4 (March 1984) (unpublished manuscript available at the Envi-
ronment Liaison Centre, Nairobi); Wirth, supra note 9, at 314.
47. 7 U.S.C. § 1360 (1978); Labeling Policy Statement, supra note 46, at 50274;
see alsoJ. Scherr & E. Spitalnik, supra note 46, at 3-4; Wirth, supra note 9, at 313-14.
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ment via the State Department.48
c. International Information Exchanges
International information exchanges are the multilateral counterpart of
domestic notice systems. These exchanges provide world-wide notice of
banned or severely restricted products, thus supplementing domestic
notice systems. 4 9 Two organizations promoting such exchange are the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 50
and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO).51
The OECD adopted an information exchange system in 1984 regarding
export of banned or severely restricted chemicals. 5 2 If an exporting
state significantly restricts a chemical for domestic use, the state should
notify any importing state before a first shipment of that chemical.
53
Similarly, the FAO, the leading international organization concerned
with pesticide exports, established the "International Code of Conduct
on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides," another information
exchange, in 1985. 54 Like the OECD system, FAO regulations require
48. The Act requires an exporter to give notice when it first ships a pesticide
unregistered for use in the United States to a particular foreign purchaser in a calen-
der year. 7 U.S.C. § 1360 (1978). This requirement covers both pesticides never
registered for use in the United States and those whose registration for use has been
cancelled or suspended. Id.; see also Labeling Policy Statement, supra note 46, at
50,274;J. Scherr & E. Spitalnik, supra note 46, at 3-4; Wirth, supra note 9, at 314.
49. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
50. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
emerged in 1960. Its primary purpose was to coordinate economic policies and har-
monize trade practices. The Organization consists of twenty-four members, primar-
ily countries with industrialized market economies. Members include "western
European States, the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand."
The OECD makes and adopts non-binding recommendations. See Wirth, supra note
9, at 310-11; see also Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development, Dec. 14, 1960, 12 U.S.T. 1728, T.I.A.S. No. 4891.
51. In the United Nations system, the FAO has special responsibilities in agricul-
ture, fisheries, forestry, and nutrition. Founded in 1945, the FAO carries out a major
program of technical advice and assistance for the agricultural community on behalf
of governments and development funding agencies; it collects, analyzes and dissemi-
nates information; it advises governments on policy and planning; and it enables gov-
ernments to meet and discuss food and agricultural problems. See FOOD AND
AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, FAO: WHAT IT IS, WHAT IT
DoEs, I/R8559/E/4.86/1/100.000, at 2 (1986).
52. See Wirth, supra note 9, at 313; see also Goldberg, supra note 9, at 1040-41;
Comment, United States Export of Banned Products: Legal and Moral Implications, 10 DEN.
J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 537, 547 (1981).
53. Wirth, supra note 9, at 313.
54. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNA-
TIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT ON DISTRIBUTION AND USE OF PESTICIDES,
M/R8130/E/5.86/1/3000 (1986) [hereinafter FAO PESTICIDE CODE] (available at
FAO Liaison Office for North America, Washington D.C.). David Bull, currently
Executive of the Nairobi-based Environment Liaison Center, viewed the Code's sig-
nificance as making industry responsible for adhering to its articles "irrespective of
government's ability to observe the Code." Bull, supra note 4, at 21. He added:
This means that malpractices can no longer be justified by the bland assur-
ance that a company was "operating within the law" of the country con-
cerned. Industry is now officially responsible regardless of government
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exporting nations to notify importing nations of significant domestic
restrictions on pesticide use.5 5 Moreover, exporters must notify import-
ing states when they export such pesticides. 5 6
H. Recent Development: The Emergence of Prior Informed Consent
In addition to the above-described "traditional" approaches to hazard-
ous exports, policy-makers have recently considered an alternative
approach-prior informed consent (PIC). "Prior informed consent"
allows export of hazardous products only under two conditions. First,
the exporting state must inform the importing state of any bans or
severe restrictions on the exported product and must provide the ration-
ale behind the domestic regulation. 57 Second, the importing country
must consent in writing to the product's import.58
This section explores the recent adoption of prior informed con-
sent. For example, the United States Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA), as well as OECD and United Nations Environ-
ment Program (UNEP) guidelines, have applied prior informed consent
to hazardous waste exports. Similarly, the Netherlands has adopted,
inadequacy.... [Ilndustry ... has given its formal support to the Code....
An infringement of the Code will clearly be a breach of proper corporate
ethics and no excuses will be acceptable. Breaches can be reported to
FAO....
Id.
During the FAO Pesticide Code negotiations, prior informed consent was an inte-
gral part of the Code's seventh draft. In the final version, drafters removed prior
informed consent from the Code despite the endorsement of more than a dozen
nation's delegates. The members included Ethiopia, Malaysia, Congo, Brazil, China,
Pakistan, Venezuela, Indonesia, Thailand, Kenya, and Mexico. Id. at 22. The FAO
conference report recognized that "the majority expressed deep concern that the
principle of 'Prior Informed Consent' no longer appeared in the present version of
the Code." Id.
Bull commented: "The exporting countries [U.S. and European Economic Com-
munity] clearly appear to have sabotaged this aspect of the Code [prior informed
consent] through covert action, while publicly declaring no specific position. They
wanted to ditch PIC but lacked the guts to take the blame." Id.
55. Article 9 of the Code established an information exchange scheme. FAO PES-
TICIDE CODE, supra note 54, at 19-20. Article 9 provides, in relevant part:
9.1 The Government of a pesticide exporting country which takes action to
ban or severely restrict pesticide use should notify directly or indirectly perti-
nent authorities of other nations.
9.2 The minimum information to be provided includes:
* the identity of the chemical
* the summary of control action and reasons for it
* reference for gaining more information.
Id.
56. Section 9.4 of the Code concerns exporting states' responsibility to inform
the importing states of banned or severely restricted pesticide exports. Id. at 20.
Section 9.4 provides, in relevant part: "The information to be provided if export
occurs includes: ... reference of information provided at the time of the notification
of control action... [and] indication that export of the chemical concerned is about
to occur." Id.
57. See VIOLATING THE CODE SURVEY, supra note 15, at 14.
58. Id.
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and UNEP and the European Community Commission have recom-
mended, the application of prior informed consent in the context of
chemical exports.
A. Hazardous Waste Exports
1. Prior Informed Consent Under the Resource and Conservation Recovery Act
The United States annually generates about 35 million metric tons of
hazardous waste. 59 In 1980, Congress enacted legislation mandating
that EPA implement "cradle to grave" regulations concerning hazard-
ous waste generation, transport, treatment, storage, and disposal under
RCRA.6 0 Because of the increased cost of complying with these regula-
tions and public opposition to waste site locations, U.S. companies
began seeking other countries willing to accept hazardous waste depos-
its.61 For instance, one Colorado company offered the President of
Sierra Leone $25 million for the right to transfer waste to his country, 6 2
while in 1986, several California companies illegally dumped hazardous
waste into Mexico. 63
Due in part to the embarrassing foreign policy ramifications such
actions have for the United States,64 Congress added a "prior informed
consent" requirement to the 1984 amendments of the RCRA which
became effective in 1986.65 In adopting this legislation, Congress
declared that the existing notification system was "inadequate to
address the present and potential environmental, health, and foreign
policy problems which occur when wastes are exported to nations which
do not wish to receive them, or lack sufficient information to manage
59. J. Scherr, supra note 9, at 14.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 6901 el seq.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 6902 (Supp. 1986). The RCRA
defines "hazardous waste" as "a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes, which
because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteris-
tics may:
(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an
increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating illness; or
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the
environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of,
or otherwise managed.
42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1982).
61. See N.Y. Times,Jan. 25, 1980, at A13, col. 5; Washington Post, Jan. 26, 1980,
at A4, col. 1; see alsoJ. Scherr, supra note 9, at 14.
62. N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1980, at A13, col. 5; Washington Post, Jan. 26, 1980, at
A4, col. 1; see alsoJ. Scherr, supra note 9, at 14-15.
63. L.A. Times, Feb. 14, 1986, at 1; San Diego Tribune, Feb. 13, 1986, at A3; San
Diego Union, Feb.13, 1986, at A3; L.A. Times, Feb. 12, 1986, at 3; San Diego Trib-
une, Feb. 12, 1986, at A3; San Diego Union, Feb. 12, 1986, at A3. col. 1.
64. When the State Department learned of the proposal to the President of Sierra
Leone, it warned that African nations might condemn the United States for "dump-
ing its wastes in the black man's backyard." N.Y. Times, Jan. 25, 1980, at A13, col. 5;
Washington Post, Jan. 26, 1980, at A4, col. 1.
65. The 1984 amendment added a new § 3017 to the Solid Waste Disposal Act.
See Public Law No. 98-616, § 245(a), 98 Stat. 3221, 3262-63 (1984) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 6938 (Supp. 1986)) [hereinafter textual references to § 3017 will be foot-
noted to the codified version]; see also Wirth, supra note 9, at 312.
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them properly." 66 Under the RCRA's new section 3017, manufacturers
cannot export hazardous waste unless they obtain prior written consent
from the receiving country's government.
6 7
The exporter must notify the EPA of its plan to ship hazardous
waste.6 8 The EPA, through the State Department, then notifies the
importing state of the exporter's request for consent to the shipment.69
If the country gives its consent, the EPA so informs the exporter who
then may ship the waste.70 Additionally, section 3017 requires export-
ers to submit annual reports detailing hazardous waste exports. 71
These requirements are waived if the United States and the government
of the receiving country have formally agreed to hazardous waste trans-
fers and the proposed shipment comports with that agreement.7
2
66. S. REP. No. 284, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1983) [hereinafter SENATE
REPORT]. The Senate Report of the Committee On Environment and Public Works
noted that when it considered the amendments the law required hazardous waste
exporters to inform the EPA four weeks before the initial shipment. The notification
did not include "any reference to the amounts to be exported; the frequency of
exports; the point at which the waste will enter the receiving country; the methods of
storage, treatment or disposal in the receiving country; or the ultimate destination of
the waste." Id.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (Supp. 1986); see also Wirth, supra note 9, at 312.
68. The exporter must include:
the types and quantities of hazardous waste to be exported;
the frequency or rate at which it is expected to be exported;
the ports of entry; and
the description of the manner in which such hazardous waste will be trans-
ported to and treated, stored, or disposed in the receiving country.
H. REP. No. 1133, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 HousE REPORT];
see also 42 U.S.C. § 6938(c) (Supp. 1986).
69. Within 30 days of the Administrator's receipt of a complete notification
under this section, the Secretary of State, acting on behalf of the Administra-
tor, shall:
1) forward a copy of the notification to the government of the receiving
country;
2) advise the government that United States law prohibits the export of haz-
ardous waste unless the receiving country consents to accept the hazardous
waste;
3) request the government to provide the Secretary with a written consent
or objection to the terms of the notification; and
4) forward to the government of the receiving country a description of the
Federal regulations which would apply to the treatment, storage, and dispo-
sal of the hazardous waste in the United States.
1983 HousE REPORT, supra note 68, at 46. See also 42 U.S.C. § 6938(d) (Supp. 1986).
70. Within 30 days of obtaining the written consent, objection or other communi-
cation from the receiving country, the EPA shall forward the communication to the
exporter. 1983 HousE REPORT, supra note 68, at 46; see also 42 U.S.C. § 6938 (Supp.
1986).
71. The EPA now requires exporters to submit a report summarizing the types,
quantities, frequency, and ultimate destination of all hazardous wastes exported dur-
ing the previous year. 50 Fed. Reg. 28,702, 28,746 (1985).
72. H. REP. No. 1122, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1984). In fact, the Senate report
states that "[e]ffective monitoring and enforcement programs must be part of any
agreement between the United States and a receiving country." SENATE REPORT,
supra note 66, at 48.
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2. The United Nations Environment Program Guidelines for Hazardous Waste
In 1985, UNEP recommended that countries engage in information
exchange and prior informed consent practices to regulate hazardous
waste exports. 7" The guidelines suggest that, absent bilateral, regional,
or multilateral arrangements, exporting states should prohibit hazard-
ous waste exportation until both the receiving state and any transit state
indicate their explicit consent to such movement.
7 4
UNEP concluded that the exporting state could best handle authori-
zation for hazardous waste export, 75 but noted that the importing state
had sole responsibility for deciding to admit the shipment.76 UNEP fur-
ther recommended that each state designate an agency to which other
countries could direct notifications and inquiries. 7 7 However, the UNEP
recommendations reach beyond traditional notions of prior informed
consent, placing additional responsibility on an exporting state. Even
where consent exists, an exporting state must prohibit "a transfrontier
movement of hazardous wastes ... if it is not satisfied that the wastes in
question can be managed in an environmentally sound manner, at an
approved site or facility." 7 8
3. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Draft
Agreement for Hazardous Waste
In 1987, the OECD adopted a draft agreement similar to the UNEP
guidelines, including both an information exchange provision and prior
informed consent mechanisms for hazardous waste shipments. 79 The
agreement's prior informed consent provision requires exporters to
provide specific information to the "competent authority of the export-
ing country,"8 0 including a copy of the pertinent regulatory informa-
73. UNEP was established at the Conference on the Human Environment in
Stockholm in 1972. In 1981, UNEP's Governing Council adopted the 1981 Monte-
video Program which provided that UNEP's Environmental Law Program convene a
number of ad hoc working groups to elaborate guidelines on such issues as hazard-
ous waste, chemicals, and pesticides. See Wirth, supra note 9, at 311. Unlike the
OECD Draft Agreement, infra notes 97-104 and accompanying text, the UNEP docu-
ment addresses both domestic and international hazardous waste management.
Negotiations took place in 1984, U.N. Doc. UNEP/WG. 111/3 (report of the second
session); see also Wirth, supra note 9, at 311. In December 1985, the UNEP Ad Hoc
Working Group of Experts on the Environmentally Sound Management of Hazard-
ous Wastes delivered its final report. See UNEP Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on
the Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous Wastes, Final Report of the
Working Group, U.N. Doc. UNEP/WG.122/3 (1985) [hereinafter UNEP Report].
74. UNEP Report, supra note 73, at Annex III, 10-1 1.
75. UNEP called on each State to ensure that hazardous waste exports be con-
trolled as stringently as those for domestic disposal. Id. Annex III, at 5.
76. Id. UNEP requires explicit consent from the importing state but finds tacit
consent sufficient to protect a transit state. Id. Annex III, at 11.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See OECD Environmental Committee, Revised Draft International Agreement
on Control of Transfrontier Movements of Hazardous Wastes, ENV(87) 9 (1 st Revi-
sion) W.5432K (Aug. 21, 1987).
80. Id. art. V(2)(a).
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tion, adequate "proof of notification," and a "copy of the written
consent from the importing country." 8 ' Like the UNEP guidelines, the
agreement gives the exporting state authority to prevent the export,
even where the importing state has consented. After receiving the
required information from the exporter, the exporting state has thirty
days to object to the shipments.8 2 The exporting state must relay its
environmental concerns to the importing state and/or its decision to
prohibit the export to the importing state.8 3
The agreement gives exporting states four reasons to prohibit an
export: when the importing state is dissatisfied with the information the
exporter supplied the importing state; when it believes the wastes will be
placed in an inadequate disposal facility; when previous exports to the
same destination were disposed of inadequately; or when the operation
"can be shown to be likely to cause significant damage" to nations
outside the importing country. 84
B. Chemical Exports
1. The Netherlands: Prior Informed Consent Implemented
The Netherlands adopted a voluntary prior informed consent procedure
for banned or severely restricted chemical exports in December 1985.85
The Dutch procedure, which entered into force on June 1, 1986,86
empowers the government to require prior informed consent for
exports of dangerous chemicals. 87 On January 31, 1986, the Minister of
81. Id. art. V(2)(a)(iv), (v), (vi).
82. Id. art. V(3)(b).
83. Id. art. (V)(3)(c), (d).
84. Id. art. v(4). Nations signing the Agreement must take appropriate measures
to enforce the prior informed consent provision. The OECD suggests that they enact
laws and promulgate regulations to ensure that private parties comply with the
Agreement. Id. art. II.
85. Bill on Voluntary Regulation of Exports Under Chemicals Act, 9 INT'L ENV'T
REP. (BNA) No. 3, at 76 (March 12, 1986). See also Letter from the Minister of Hous-
ing, Physical Planning and the Environment of the Netherlands to the Parliament of
the Netherlands, at 1-2 (July 7, 1987) (concerning the export of dangerous sub-
stances) (available in English at the Netherlands Embassy in Washington, D.C.)
[hereinafter Minister's 1987 letter] and Letter from the Minister of Housing, Physical
Planning and the Environment of the Netherlands to the Parliament of the Nether-
lands, at 23-26 (Nov. 20, 1985) (concerning the export of dangerous substances)
(available in English at the Netherlands Embassy in Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter
Minister's 1985 letter].
86. UNEP/IRPTC NLD 86-1, at 3. On Sept. 1, 1986,Jan W. Huismans, Director
of UNEP, issued a memorandum to designated national authorities regarding the
Netherlands action. [hereinafter Huismans Memo] (available at Netherlands Embassy
in Washington, D.C.).
87. Bill on Voluntary Regulation of Exports Under Chemicals Act, 9 INT'L ENV'T
REP. (BNA) No. 3, at 76 (March 12, 1986). For a copy of the legislation see MINISTRY
OF HOUSING, PHYSICAL PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS, NETHER-
LANDS CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES ACT AND REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE NOTIFICATION
OF NEw CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES, § 29, at 16 (1987) (available at the Netherlands
Embassy, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter the Netherlands Chemical Substances Act].
See also MINISTRY OF HOUSING, PHYSICAL PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENT OF THE NETHER-
ANDS, NETHERLANDS CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES ACT: KEY ISSUES, at 18-19 (available at
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Environment explained that implementation of the procedure could be
voluntary and non-binding if "industry itself is prepared and able to
make agreements that lead to the desired results."8 8 The Dutch prior
informed consent scheme allows the export of specified banned or
severely restricted chemicals only if the exporter has certified that the
importing country does not forbid the chemical from entering its market
and if the importing state's designated authority approves of the
import.8 9 The exporter shall annually send a notification to the desig-
nated authority of the importing state prior to the first export of that
year.90 If the exporter cannot obtain an adequate reply to its notifica-
tion, the government may still permit the export to enter the country
the Netherlands Embassy, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter Key Issues]. For general
legislative history, see Minister's 1985 letter, supra note 85, at 3-7 and Minister's 1987
letter, supra note 85, at 1-2. The Minister explained that the objective of the prior
informed consent scheme is to "improve the infrastructure in developing countries
for assessing the dangers which chemical substances pose to man and the environ-
ment and improve the regulations required for this purpose and ... to encourage
safe use and responsible handling of chemicals." Minister's 1987 letter, supra note
85, at 2.
88. Bill on Voluntary Regulation of Exports Under Chemicals Act, 9 INr'L ENv'T
REP. (BNA) No. 3, at 76 (Mar. 12, 1986). The Minister explained his intentions prior
to the enactment of prior informed consent provision, § 29, of the Chemical Sub-
stances Act:
The ultimate aim is to implement section 29 of the Bill by means of a general
administrative order, but there are still a number of ... aspects which must
be investigated further before it will be possible to formalise statutory provi-
sions on the export of dangerous substances and preparations and bring
them into force.
Furthermore, I believe that the self-regulatory scheme proposed by the
industry could be a good way of achieving the objectives of section 29 of the
Bill.... By cooperating with the industry in the use of its scheme to put
section 29 into effect provisionally, it will be possible in the short term to take
steps to achieve objectives of those who initiated the amendment, [and] to
gain experience which can then be put to good effect in the general adminis-
trative order.
Minister's 1985 letter, supra note 85, at 6.
89. Huismans Memo, supra note 86, at I; Netherlands Chemical Substances Act,
supra note 87, § 29.3, at 16. As of June 7, 1987, nineteen nations have cooperated
with the Netherlands by designating authorities to handle the prior informed consent
procedure. The nineteen countries include: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Columbia,
Ghana, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Malta, Mozambique, Panama, Peru, Republic of Nauru,
Republic of Vanuatu, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka,
Tanzania, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago and Zimbabwe. Minister's 1987 letter, supra
note 85, at 10. For a list of the specified banned or severely restricted chemicals, see
Minister's 1987 letter, supra note 85, at 10. For legislative history of § 29.3 of the
Netherlands Chemical Substances Act, see Minister's 1985 letter, supra note 85, at
19-21.
90. Huismans Memo, supra note 86, at 2. The notification shall consist of data
concerning at least:
the chemical identity;
the control action in the Netherlands;
the address in the Netherlands where further information may be obtained.
If the designated authority of the importing country states that the use of
such chemical has been banned and that it will not approve of its import, the
exporting person shall voluntarily refrain from exporting the chemical.
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under certain circumstances. 9 1 In addition, in certain circumstances,
the exporter need not send a notification. 92 The Netherlands program,
in its first year, showed modest success. 9 3
2. UNEP Proposes Prior Informed Consent
On June 17, 1987, the Governing Council for UNEP adopted a draft
decision, acknowledging prior informed consent's effectiveness in
enhancing the information exchange system between importing and
exporting countries.9 4 The Governing Council stated that "additional
measures [based on the principle of prior informed consent] are
required to enable importing countries to give or withhold their consent
to particular exports following receipt of adequate information from
exporting countries.' '
Id. See also Minister's 1985 Letter, supra note 85, at 24-25.
91. If the exporting person is unable to obtain a reply or a clear reply to the
notification, the export will only take place if: "it appears that the designated author-
ity of the importing country otherwise approves the import or use of the chemical
concerned... [and] the authorized government body in the importing country does
not react to the notification of the exporter even after having been pressed for an
answer." Huismans Memo, supra note 86, at 2. Minister's 1985 letter, supra note 85,
at 25.
92. The exporting firms shall not send a notification if:
the full name and address of the authorized government body of the import-
ing country, is not available;
the government of the importing country has shown no interest for imple-
mentation of a prior informed consent procedure;
if the central government of the importing country is directly or indirectly
party to the transaction.
Huismans Memo, supra note 86, at 2-3. See also Minister's 1985 letter, supra note 85,
at 25.
93. During the first year of the Netherlands prior informed consent program only
a small number of notifications of export took place due to the involvement of a small
number of countries, fourteen at that time, and that "only a small number of sub-
stances... whose use is banned or severely restricted are exported from the Nether-
lands to these developing countries." Minister's 1987 letter, supra note 85, at 3.
Nevertheless, the procedure proved to be successfully implemented. For example,
Shell Netherlands used the procedure eight times regarding the pesticides aldrin and
dieldrin. Id. The Minister reported that:
In one instance the country responded to the notification by stating that it
would in [the] future no longer import aldrin, dieldrin or other orga-
nochlorine insecticides. This country is afraid that if it continues to use these
pesticides certain industrialized countries will refuse to import its agricultural
products because of the presence of residues from these insecticides. Shell
has now ceased to export to this country and the country in question has
apparently now banned imports of all organochlorine compounds from other
countries too. A second country issued a statement of no objection to the
sale and use of a specific product containing aldrin for a number of named
uses for a few months on a provisional basis.
Id. For a discussion of the Dutch scheme in international circles, see id. at 6-9.
94. Report of the Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Pro-
gramme on the Work of its Fourteenth Session, No. 87-1079-0047c, Nairobi Meet-
ing, June, 1987 [hereinafter Governing Council Report].
95. Id.
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The Governing Council stated that the London Guidelines for the
Exchange of Information on Chemicals in International Trade should
incorporate prior informed consent and requested that an Ad Hoc Work-
ing Group of Experts develop "modalities of prior informed consent"
for the London Guidelines.9 6
3. European Community Commission Proposes Modified Prior Informed
Consent
Like UNEP, the European Economic Community (EEC) has considered
prior informed consent but has not adopted a binding procedure. On
July 2, 1986, the Commission of the European Community submitted to
the Council a proposal for regulating chemical exports that would
implement prior informed consent. 97 If the Council of Ministers
approves the proposed regulations, it will bind all member states of the
EEC and carry the force of law in member state courts.
Under the consent aspect of the notice aspect of the Commission
proposal, each member state will have a "designated authority" to deal
with hazardous exports. 98 Exporters shall inform their state's pertinent
designated authority of planned exports of twenty-three banned or
severely restricted chemicals. 9 9 The designated authority shall inform
the Commission of the intended export and submit all relevant informa-
tion. 10 0 The Commission shall then notify the importing state's desig-
nated authority of the export and relay any pertinent information.' 0 '
Under the proposal, a member state's designated authority should
authorize a hazardous export "only if the country of designation con-
sents to the import of the chemical concerned or if no communication is
96. Id. The London Guidelines can be found at UNEP/GC.14/17, Annex IV.
97. EEC Proposes Regulation on Notification of Export of Banned, Restricted Chemicals, 9
INT'L ENV'T REP. (BNA) 276 (Aug. 13, 1986). For full text of the proposal, entitled
"The European Community Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation Con-
cerning Export from and Import into the Community of Certain Dangerous Chemi-
cals, Coin (86) 362 Final, 2 July 1986," see id. at 300 [hereinafter Commission
Proposal].
The Commission proposal adopted the principal that "dangerous chemicals
should be exported only to States which have previously agreed to allow their impor-
tation." Id. art. 4, para. I. The Commission of the European Communities com-
prises thirteen individuals appointed by the Council, on the recommendation of the
nine member governments. Commissioners owe their allegiance to the Community
alone, not to any other government or body. The Commission initiates policy and
drafts the legislation as proposals for the disposition by the Council of Ministers.
The Council of Ministers consists of representatives of the governments of member
states. The Council is the main decisionmaking body within the community, making
the final decision for most community problems.
98. Commission Proposal, supra note 97, art. 2. Article 2 states: "The term 'des-
ignated authority' shall refer to the competent authority in each state for the notifica-
tion and information procedures with regard to the import and export of banned or
severely restricted chemicals." Id.
99. Id. art. 3, para. 2. For a list of the twenty-three banned or severely restricted
chemicals, see id. at Annex I.
100. Id. art. 3, para. 3.
101. Id.
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received from that country within 60 days of the date on which notifica-
tion was sent by the Commission." 102
Environmental groups, however, criticized the proposal for
returning a presumption in favor of exportation.' 0 3 For example, the
Coalition Against Dangerous Exports said the proposal "amounts to 'lit-
tie more' than the incorporation into EEC law of the 'inadequate' notifi-
cation systems" recommended by OECD, UNEP, and the FAO. 10 4
m. Analysis
This section contrasts the advantages of a pure prior informed consent
procedure with the failings of current hazardous export control tech-
niques. It then assesses the criticisms of prior informed consent, con-
cluding that prior informed consent's clear benefits outweigh any
speculative disadvantages. Finally, the section explores the United
States's potential leadership role in curtailing unnecessary hazardous
exports and anticipates emerging issues regarding prior informed
consent.
A. The Inherent Flaws of Notice-Type Systems
Notice systems leave importing states, especially developing nations,
vulnerable to health and safety dangers. Many countries lack the regula-
tory infrastructure to unilaterally protect their citizens from hazardous
products already banned or severely restricted in an exporting coun-
try. 10 5 Policing their borders against undesired imports is similarly
beyond their capabilities.10 6 Moreover, hazardous product importers
may not have the resources or expertise to use the products safely.' 0 7
The inherent flaws of notice systems undermine the ability of
importing states to know a product's potential risks. Notice of a hazard-
ous shipment may not reach proper authorities until after completion of
the shipment.10 8 Additionally, because notice systems are usually gen-
102. Id. art. 4, para. 2 (emphasis added). The authorization will be effective for
twelve months, allowing the export to clear customs. Id. art. 4, para. 4.
103. Proposal Would Regulate Exports of Dangerous Chemicals From Community, 9 INT'L
ENV'T REP. (BNA) 68 (Mar. 12, 1986).
104. Id. Most EEC members have already pledged to implement these nationally
anyway. Id.
105. Goldberg, supra note 9, at 1030. One commentator stated: "There is a con-
siderable difference in most Third World countries between paper legislation and
actual practice. Enforcement is usually minimal, with virtually no inspectors. In
some countries the equivalent of the Environmental Protection Agency amounts to a
single person with little power and less resources." Bull, supra note 4, at 20 (1986).
106. Telephone interview with David Wirth, former State Department official (Feb.
27, 1987).
107. Goldberg, supra note 9, at 1030; see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 66, at 47.
See generally VIOLATING THE CODE SURVEY, supra note 15.
108. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL
COMMITTEE FOR MAN AND THE BIOSPHERE, PROCEEDINGS OF THE U.S. STRATEGY CON-
FERENCE ON PESTICIDE MANAGEMENT, 3-4 (1979) [hereinafter STATE DEPARTMENT
PROCEEDINGS].
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eral, not shipment-specific, importing nations have less control than
under a prior informed consent framework. 10 9 A nation may not object
to a small, initial shipment, not knowing that shipments will continue
indefinitely. Finally, the exporting state has little assurance that the
proper authorities in the importing state have considered and examined
the relevant information, especially when the importing state lacks a
sophisticated regulatory system.' 10 Hazardous products, therefore, may
enter the importing state's marketplace without adequate deliberation.
1. American Notice Systems
Prior informed consent achieves the goals of the pure notice system
more effectively than current notice schemes. For example, the U.S.
notice system for chemical exports under the Toxic Substances Control
Act alerts the importing country's government of both the chemical
export and the EPA's regulatory action.1 11 Prior informed consent's
explicit consent provision, however, would increase the likelihood that
the importing state's authorities are aware of and have examined the
information. "12
A prior informed consent framework would also be more advanta-
geous in the pesticide export area. Although in theory The Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act requires that foreign pur-
chasers be aware of U.S. restrictions on domestic use of the product, 113
the EPA awareness statement often reaches local authorities long after
the pesticides have arrived."t 4 The EPA itself has stated that it "does
not consider that the acknowledgement statement is primarily intended
to serve as pre-shipment notification to foreign governments in order
that they may intercept shipments of such pesticides." 15
109. SeeJ. Scherr & E. Spitalnik, supra note 46, at 3.
110. See 1978 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 15; STATE DEPARTMENT PROCEED-
INGS, supra note 108, at 3-4.
111. See supra note 44.
112. For example, under the TSCA and FIFRA notice systems, supra note 46, the
exporter mails the notice to the importing nation's embassy in Washington D.C.,
rather than to regulatory authorities. This system lessens the likelihood of pre-ship-
ment notice. Telephone Interview with David Wirth, former State Department offi-
cial (Feb. 27, 1987).
One critic of the notice system stated:
[N]otifications of control actions do not have much impact on exports of
banned or severely restricted pesticides. In fact, the notices transmitted by
EPA rarely reach the appropriate officials in developing countries, who might
be able to evaluate the information and use it for national regulatory action.
There are very few known cases in which importing countries actually
decided to ban the importation and use of a particular pesticide as a result of
a notification from the United States.
Pallemaerts, supra note 28, at 25.
113. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
114. Pallemaerts, supra note 28, at 25.
115. 45 Fed. Reg. 50,276 (1980).
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2. International Information Exchanges
Commentators, including the Secretary-General of the United Nations,
recognize that voluntary information exchange systems "may not be a
completely adequate response to the problem [of hazardous
exports]." 1 6 For example, in the chemical export area, the OECD
advocates information exchange rather than prior informed consent.' 1 7
Under the OECD approach, however, chemicals which the exporting
state domestically bans may enter the importing nation's marketplace
with little deliberation by local governments.1 1 Even if states imple-
ment the OECD system in good faith, importing states might fail to rec-
ognize and act on the information supplied. For example, while the U.S.
export policy for chemicals and pesticides requires annual notice, ' 19 the
OECD notice scheme requires only first export notice. 120 Thus, danger-
ous imports may continue indefinitely without assurance that the
importing state recognizes or remembers the single, initial notice.
The same problems occur under the FAO information exchange for
exports of banned or severely restricted products.' 2 ' The FAO system
fails to provide shipment-specific information to the importing state.
Notice, therefore, may not reach the importing state until after the ship-
ments have arrived. 12 2 Like other information exchanges, the FAO pol-
icy creates a presumption in favor of hazardous exports instead of
against them, failing to recognize the vulnerability of many states lacking
regulatory expertise.
B. Modified PIG Procedures
A pure prior informed consent procedure, such as the U.S., OECD, and
UNEP hazardous waste policies, forbids the export of banned or
severely restricted products unless the importing state explicitly con-
sents. Although the Netherlands and the Commission of European
Communities have offered modified prior informed consent procedures,
these procedures are flawed; the Commission's proposal, in particular,
resembles a notice system more than prior informed consent.
The Commission's modified prior informed consent proposal
places the presumption in favor of export; hazardous waste export is
prohibited only when the importing country responds negatively to the
notice. 123 Indeed, the modified prior informed consent proposal differs
only slightly from a notice system. Both systems rely upon the import-
ing nation's objection before stopping export, but the Commission's
116. United Nations Secretary-General, "Exchange of Information on Banned
Hazardous Chemicals and Unsafe Pharmaceutical Products," U.N.Doc. a/36/255
(1981), 8.
117. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 111-15 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 54-56 accompanying text.
122. Pallemaerts, supra note 28, at 25.
123. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
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proposal sets in place a regularized mechanism for states to make such
objections. For many Third World states, an effective prior informed
consent procedure for banned or severely restricted chemicals must pre-
sume the prohibition on trade unless the importing state affirmatively
consents to the import. Only a presumption against hazardous exports
would enable importing states to make informed decisions regarding
imports.
Although the Netherlands adopted a prior informed consent proce-
dure for banned or severely restricted chemicals, countries should be
wary of using the Dutch program as a model. The Dutch program is
voluntary. The program may well be effective in the Dutch regulatory
system, which, according to the Dutch embassy, often relies on govern-
mental and business cooperation more than on governmental coercion.
To be effective in the more adversarial American system, however, prior
informed consent needs mandatory requirements with sanctions for
failed compliance.
C. Non-Notice Systems: The Extremes of Caveat Emptor and Bans
Caveat emptor is essentially a policy of non-action. Many countries prac-
ticing it, like the United States in its policy towards consumer product
exports, do not practice it at home. If market mechanisms are less ade-
quate in the developed U.S. economy, they are likely even more inade-
quate in less developed economies, where both business and individual
consumers lack the access to a wide range of information necessary for
informed decision-making and the sophisticated tools that enable richer
consumers to use a hazardous product safely. Any product so danger-
ous that a country feels the need to severely regulate or ban its use inter-
nally requires regulation when sold to poorer countries.
Bans on hazardous exports, in contrast, are admittedly even more
effective than prior informed consent. A ban on products deemed
unsafe by an exporting nation protects nations lacking the capacity to
make sophisticated or frequent regulatory decisions.' 24 Bans also pro-
tect nations from corrupt officials who may accept bribes in exchange for
admitting unduly hazardous products.' 2 5 Bans, however, are paternalis-
tic and conflict with notions of state sovereignty. 126 States often have
different needs. One state may find, for example, that a particular pesti-
cide's dangers outweigh its benefits, while another state legitimately
decides the opposite. The second state may reap quite different benefits
from the pesticide's use because the pesticide addresses a problem dif-
124. For a description of inadequate Third World regulatory capacity, see
Goldberg, supra note 9, at 1030; see also Agege, supra note 23, at 406; Wirth, supra
note 9, at 312-13.
125. For a discussion on the merits of bans, see Pallemaerts, supra note 28, at 26.
126. Exporting states, such as West Germany, believe this policy irresponsible
because it infringes on "the sovereignty of importing countries and their freedom to
make their own risk/benefit assessments and regulatory decisions." Id.
Vol. 21
1988 Hazardous Exports
ferent in kind or degree from the problem it would address in the first
state.
D. The Need for Notice and Consent
Prior informed consent preserves the sovereignty and self-determina-
tion of importing states, 127 while enhancing the ability of states to pro-
tect their citizens and environment. Because prior informed consent
places the burden to accept on the importing state, it ensures a state
receives hazardous products only after affirmatively deciding that it
needs them. Prior informed consent avoids infringing state sovereignty
as do bans, yet effectuates the policies of notice better than notice sys-
tems themselves. Requiring affirmative consent heightens the importing
state's attention and deliberation.
Prior informed consent, however, is not without critics. Opponents
worry that, since information exchanges already exist for many prod-
ucts, the system may be duplicative.1 28 This criticism, however, ignores
the purpose of prior informed consent, which is not to give decision-
makers new information, but to encourage well-considered decisions
based on available information.
A more troubling criticism of prior informed consent is that the sys-
tem will prove impractical, bureaucratic, and burdensome.1 29 In the
pesticide area, for example, where timely response to food production
needs necessitates quick shipments, delays may cause crop losses.130
Although the prior informed consent experience of hazardous waste
control under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act suggests
that prior informed consent can be efficient, it does not answer this par-
ticular concern. Hazardous waste shipments do not require the kind of
timely approval and shipment critics fear will be needed occasionally for
pesticides. Moreover, the same problems of inadequate Third World
regulatory structures that render notice systems ineffective could like-
wise interfere with the ability of Third World regulators to make quick
decisions when needed. Such problems, however, remain speculative.
If they arise after implementation of prior informed consent, the states
creating the procedure can modify it in the pesticide area to provide
greater flexibility.
For the typical situation, importers can avoid prior informed con-
sent-related delays by advance planning and by making product safety a
purchasing criteria. Although the transition period under a prior
informed consent scheme might be difficult, over time prior informed
consent would become a regular aspect of business activity. An import-
ing state need only consent as promptly as possible to trigger the
import. Moreover, since prior informed consent only targets products
that the exporting state banned or severely restricted for domestic use,
127. See Goldberg, supra note 9, at 1033.
128. NACA Position Paper, supra note 5.
129. Id
130. Id.
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importers concerned about delays may choose non-restricted, alterna-
tive products.13 1
A final concern that even prior informed consent supporters must
concede is that the system's effectiveness depends on the diligence of
importing state authorities. Government indifference to environmental
or consumer protection due to corruption or the ability of powerful mul-
tinational corporations to hold a government "hostage" could make a
mockery of that country's prior informed consent policy. Such
problems might require modifying prior informed consent in the direc-
tion of a traditional ban. Such a modification would require exporting
states to forbid export if they believe that, despite the importing state's
affirmative consent, the state could not manage the product safely. The
United States, for instance, may ultimately address such an issue under
the RCRA. Prior informed consent is not a panacea. It serves as a rea-
sonable halfway point between notice and an outright ban. The possible
remaining problems reflect a deliberate policy choice of sacrificing some
safety so as to respect state sovereignty.
E. The Need For U.S. Leadership in Hazardous Export Control
As one commentator observed, "[t]he role of the U.S. Government, and
particularly Congress, in this process should not be underestimated.
Other nations have repeatedly stressed the catalytic role of the United
States for foreign undertakings and international cooperation in the
environmental field."' 132 The FIFRA notice system for pesticides, for
example, influenced the development of international information
exchange ideas; 133 and the RCRA prior informed consent procedure for
hazardous wastes influenced UNEP's adoption of a similar proce-
dure. 134 The United States generally has elaborate regulatory struc-
tures for consumer and environmental protection, while many nations'
regulatory structures are inadequate to handle complex health and
safety problems.' 3 5 The United States is thus in a position to pioneer
new hazardous export control techniques such as prior informed
consent.
Domestic industry could benefit from prior informed consent pro-
cedures, as might U.S. foreign policy. For example, American industrial
competitiveness diminishes when "made in USA" stands not for safety,
but for "let the buyer beware" of injury, illness, or even death.' 3 6 Simi-
larly, hazardous exports may create diplomatic problems for the United
States. Developing nations may view U.S. policy as constituting a
131. Safer product use might therefor increase because of the comparative disad-
vantage of banned or severely restricted products.
132. See Wirth, supra note 9, at 314.
133. Id; see supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 80-105 and accompanying text; see also Wirth, supra note 9, at
312.
135. Goldberg, supra note 9, at 1030.
136. Working Group Report, supra note 10, at 53754, 53758; see also Agege, supra
note 23, at 407.
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double standard, placing citizens of developing nations at much greater
risk than Americans.13 7 Prior informed consent allows the United States
the opportunity to demonstrate concern for other countries' well-being
in a way respectful of their sovereignty.
IV. Conclusion
Current U.S. law and international guidelines for the export of banned
or severely restricted products inadequately protect world health and
the environment. Notice and information exchange schemes, for exam-
ple, fail to ensure that the importing state's authorities use due consider-
ation for the hazardous import. Prior informed consent offers the best
balance of health, safety, and environmental protection while permitting
exportation of hazardous products when desired or necessary. Because
of the United States' well-developed product regulatory structure and
economic leverage, the United States may be best suited to encourage
greater safety standards in the international marketplace. The United
States, therefore, should implement prior informed consent procedures
domestically and advocate their adoption in the international arena.
Cyrus Mehri
137. SeeJ. Scherr, supra note 9, at 2; see also supra notes 6-26, 32-39 and accompany-
ing text. The Carter Administration reached this conclusion regarding some
extremely dangerous products. See supra note 27; see also Working Group Report,
supra note 10.

